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Coalitions and Collective
Memories: A Search for Common
Ground

by Ediberto Roman*
We're going to take this movement and... reach out to the poorpeople
in all directions in this country .. into the Southwest after Indians,
into the West after the Chicanos, into Appalachiaafter poor whites, and
into the ghettos after Negroes and PuertoRicans. And we are going to
bring them together and enlarge this campaign into something bigger
thanjust a civil rights movement for Negroes.1
- Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
I never will forget one little blonde co-ed.... She demanded right in
my face, "don't you believe there are any good white people?" .
"What can I do?" she exclaimed. I told her, "Nothing."
I regret that I told her that. I wish ... I could telephone her, or write
to her, and tell her what I tell white people now when they present
themselves as being sincere ...I tell them that at least where my...
organization is concerned, they can't join us .... Where the really
sincere white people have got to do their "proving"of themselves is not
among the black victims, but out on the battle lines of where America's

* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs & Professor of Law, Florida International
University. Lehman College, City University of New York (B.A., 1985); University of
Wisconsin (J.D., 1988). I would like to thank Professors Richard Delgado, Jean Stefancic,
Kevin Johnson, Jorge Esquirol, and Thomas Baker for their insightful comments on earlier
drafts of this Article. I am particularly appreciative of Professor Delgado's contribution
because he added great value to this project despite knowing this essay takes issue with
his writings concerning inter-minority group coalitions. Finally, I would like to thank Ms.
Sandra Trujillo for her outstanding research assistance.
1.

LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING

POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY (Harvard Univ. Press 2002) [hereinafter MINER'S
CANARY].
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racism really is-and that's in their own home communities;America's
racism is among their own fellow whites.2

- Malcolm X
I.

INTRODUCTION

The above quotes from two path breakers of the civil rights era evince
clashing visions of coalition building-one embracing inter-minority
group coalitions and the other questioning their usefulness. Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. in the name of social justice called for ever-expanding
collaboration, which included whites; Malcolm X rejected such coalitions
as unnecessary and misdirected. Though several decades old, these
conflicting sentiments-one following an assimilationist model and the
other more nationalist-are still the subject of academic debate. In fact,
a considerable amount of legal scholarship, written primarily by scholars
of color, has recently taken contrasting views regarding the efficacy and
propriety of coalitional efforts. These scholars have included some of the
academy's most accomplished authors, including Lani Guinier,3 Gerald
Torres,4 Richard Delgado,5 Haunani-Kay Trask,6 Robert Williams,7
Kevin Johnson,8 and Eric Yamamoto?
The following pages explore this contemporary debate, and ultimately
sides in favor of inter-minority group coalitions, as they may be effective
democratic vehicles towards social change.
Part II examines the
argument in favor of inter-minority group coalitions. Part III addresses
the challenges to those positions, including the arguments posed by
leading skeptics. Finally, Part IV rejects the cynicism associated with
coalitions and proposes a concrete point of commonality that may help
forge much needed common ground for many racial and ethnic outsider
groups.

2. ALEX HALEY & MALCOLM X, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X 256 (1965).
3. MINER'S CANARY, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. Richard Delgado, Linking Arms: Recent Books on InterracialCoalitionas an Avenue
of Social Reform, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 855 (2003) (book review) [hereinafter Delgado,

Linking Arms].
6. Haunani-Kay Trask, Coalition-BuildingBetween Nativesand Non-Natives, 43 STAN.
L. REV. 1197 (1991).

7. Robert A. Williams, Jr., Linking Arms Together: MulticulturalConstitutionalismin
a North American Indigenous Vision of Law and Peace, 82 CAL. L. REV. 981 (1994).
8. Kevin R. Johnson, The Strugglefor Civil Rights: The Need For, and Impediments to,
Political Coalitions Among and Within Minority Groups, 63 LA. L. REV. 759 (2003)
[hereinafter Johnson, The Struggle for Civil Rights].
9. ERic YAMAMOTO, INTERRAciAL JusTICE: CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN POSTCIvIL RIGHTs AMERICA (1999).
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THE ADVOCATES

Those who advocate inter-minority coalitions' ° tend to emphasize
changing national demographics, especially the growth of the Latino
community. At least one advocate has termed the Latino community as
the new "'favored minority"' and the new "'majority minority"' group,1'
noting that that community will become the largest minority group by
the year 2050." As one writer put it, the optimism associated with
these coalitions stems from the old maxim that "'there is power in numbers. '""3 These numbers are approaching the point where the coalitions
legitimately expect to14challenge racial hierarchy and white supremacy
in the United States.

In their recent book on the subject, The Miner's Canary, Professors
Guinier and Torres support a recasting of constructions of race in favor
of the use of the term "political race," which would include a host of
different minority groups that could choose to join a coalition of the
previously marginalized. 5 To the authors, this new construction can
bolster the participation of previously marginalized groups.16 They
assert that "[p]olitical race is therefore a motivational project. Rebuilding a movement for change can happen only if we reclaim our democratic
imagination." 17 By way of example, these authors point to the dramatic
way in which African-Americans and Mexican-Americans responded to
a legal ruling against affirmative action in Texas. 8 After examining
that effort, the authors summarize their thesis: "[the African-American

10. While few would question the sincerity of their respective commitments to social
justice, these advocates, who happen to represent various minority groups, have far from
agreed on whether inter-minority group coalitions are a legitimate vehicle to achieve civil
rights reform.
11. Adrien Katherine Wing, Civil Rights In the Post 911 World: Critical Race Praxis,
Coalition Building, and the War On Terrorism, 63 LA. L. REV. 717, 745-46 (2003).
12. Id. at 745; see also Johnson, The Struggle for Civil Rights, supra note 8, at 767.
13. Johnson, The Struggle for Civil Rights, supra note 8, at 767.
14. Id.
15. MINER'S CANARY, supra note 1, at 12. Professor Robert Chang similarly calls for
a recasting of labels or identity constructs. For instance, Chang uses the term "people of
color" in a similar fashion to Torres and Guinier's construction of "political race" in order
to form a new political identity. Chang characterizes his label as part of "radical
democracy" that "offers a way beyond coalitional politics." ROBERT S. CHANG, DISORIENTED:
ASIAN AMERICANS, LAW, AND THE NATION-STATE 129 (1999). Interestingly, despite his
rejection of identity-based political coalitions, Chang's proposal is in fact an explicit
political coalition based on progressive politics. See id. at 129-30.
16. See MINER'S CANARY, supra note 1, at 12.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 74.
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and Mexican-American] activism showed how collective racial identity
can operate within the American paradigm, not as the limiting
essentialism denounced by conservatives and neoliberals but rather as
the locus for individual and communal participation." 9
In his book, Interracial Justice, Professor Eric Yamamoto similarly
examines a host of reconciliation projects and coalition efforts.2 °
Yamamoto calls for the mutual acknowledgment and recognition of the
respective histories of each member of a coalition.2' Other authors
have likewise placed great value on the role of finding a common ground
in any coalition effort.22 Like Yamamoto, these authors tend to believe
that finding such points of commonality is a necessary starting point for
any coalition. 23 While advocating the need for traditional domestic
minority groups to defend the rights of Arabs and Muslims, one writer
traces the evolution of critical race scholars' growing interest in
coalitional politics in order to achieve civil rights reform.24 She
emphasizes the importance of finding a common understanding within
groups. 25 Other scholars have championed such coalitions, stressing
perceived common interests.2 6 Examining Asian and Latino and Latina
groups, another writer highlights each group's shared views on
"immigration, family, citizenship, nationhood, language, expression,
culture, and global economic restructuring."27 Overall, these advocates
not only use political pragmatism and democratic idealism as vehicles
to promote their goals, but they also tend to look to constructions of
identity and mutual interests as starting points for mobilization.
Though most of these scholars note the need for shared experiences,

19. Id. at 74-75.
20. See generally, YAMAMOTO, supra note 9.
21. Id. at 175-85.
22. See, e.g., Mary Romero, Historicizing and Symbolizing a Racial Ethnic Identity:
Lessons for Coalition Building with a Social JusticeAgenda, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1599
(2000).
23. Johnson, The Struggle for Civil Rights, supra note 8, at 774 ("At a minimum,
dialogue and discussion will be required in any effort to hash out common ground on the
modem conception of civil rights."); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Civil Rights and
Immigration:Challengesfor the Latino Community in the Twenty-First Century, 8 LA RAZA
L.J. 42, 56 (1995).
24. Wing, supra note 11, at 719-21.
25. See id. at 739.
26. Francisco Valdes, Under Construction-LatCritConsciousness, Community, and
Theory, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1140 (1997).
27. Id.
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several nonetheless stress the need to acknowledge points of difference
between members of any coalition.2"
III.

THE CHALLENGES AND THE CYNICS

The search for common ground, though a foundational component of
any coalition effort, is nonetheless often fraught with pitfalls. These
pitfalls may be manifested in a variety of ways. For instance, in an
effort to find commonalities, the realities of different histories of racial
and ethnic groups may arise.29

Finding rallying points between

different groups with different experiences has historically proven to be
difficult.3" Many coalitions fail because of what is known as the zerosum game-the gain of one minority group at the expense of another.31
Both supporters and detractors of coalitions raise the specter of such

28. See Athena D. Mutua, ShiftingBottoms and RotatingCenters:Reflections on LatCrit
III and the Black! White Paradigm,53 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1177, 1178 (1999) ("[Tlhe problems
of building coalitions and developing political agendas bring us face-to-face with the reality
that different racial and ethnic groups have distinct histories and interests, some of which
collide."); Romero, supranote 22, at 1599 ("Although groups centering on discrete identities
struggled to find a rallying point from which to advocate social justice and coalition
building, this has proven to be a difficult project."); Enid Trucios-Haynes, The Legacy of
Racially Restrictive ImmigrationLaws and Policiesand the Construction of the American
National Identity, 76 OR. L. REV. 369, 374 (1997) ("Alliances within and among
communities of color require an understanding of the situated position of noncitizens of
color within this racial hierarchy. Therefore, the hierarchies of race and oppression must
be overcome to form effective intra-group and inter-group coalitions."); CHANG, supra note
15, at 128 ("[T]raditional civil rights work and critical race theory must take into account
the different experiences of different groups.").
29. Mutua, supra note 28, at 1178; see also Tauyna Lovell Banks, Both Edges of the
Margin:Blacks and Asians in Mississippi Masala,Barriersto CoalitionBuilding, 5 ASIAN
L.J. 7, 34-35 (1998); OurNext Race Question:The UneasinessBetween Blacks andLatinos,
HARPER'S MAG., Apr. 1996, at 55 (panel discussion of Cornel West, Earl Shorris, and Jorge
Kior de Alva); Kevin R. Johnson, "Melting Pot" or "Ring of Fire"?:Assimilation and the
Mexican-American Experience, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1274 (1997) (considering racism
toward African-Americans among Latinos and Latinas); Toni Morrison, On The Backs Of
Blacks, in ARGUING IMMIGRATION: THE DEBATE OVER THE CHANGING FACE OF AMERICA 97
(Nicolaus Mills ed., 1994) (contending that the final stage of immigrant assimilation
requires adoption of racist attitudes toward African-Americans); Viet D. Dinh, Races,
Crime, and the Law, 111 HARv. L. REV. 1289, 1292 (1998) (book review) ("Nonblack
minorities ... often distinguished themselves from and at times expressly denigrated
blacks.").
30. See generally Romero, supra note 22.
31. See Johnson, The Struggle for Civil Rights, supra note 8, at 776 (citing Orlando
Patterson, Race by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR
3759630 (contending that the inclusion of [Latinos and Latinas] and other groups in
affirmative-action programs had resulted in diminished political support for the programs,
to the detriment of African-Americans)).
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hierarchies within minority groups.3 2 Professor Enid Trucios-Haynes,
an advocate of coalition building, acknowledges "the hierarchies of race
and oppression must be overcome to form effective intra-group and intergroup coalitions." 3 On the other end of the coalitional divide, Professor
Richard Delgado, one of the legal academy's leading scholars, is skeptical
of inter-minority group coalitions. 4 Delgado questions whether diverse
minority groups will "be able to work together toward mutual goals--or
[will] the current factionalism and distrust continue into the future
... .,,35 Echoing one of the challenges raised by Yen Le Espiritu,
Delgado observes the inevitability that within any given coalition there
is likely to be at least one high-status, influential, and relatively
assimilated group that expects to assume a position of power and
authority over the coalition. 36 Delgado argues that "[tihis practice not
only adopts the master's tools and thus unwittingly strengthens his
house, but it also weakens the coalition."37 As a metaphor for his
skepticism, Delgado looked to the game of baseball, arguing that when
fighting for social justice, outsider groups may more closely resemble a
solitary batter instead of a member of the team playing the field;" In

32.

Compare Trucios-Haynes, supra note 28, with Delgado, Linking Arms, supra note

5.
33. Trucios-Haynes, supra note 28, at 374.
34. Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fifteenth Chronicle: Racial Mixture, Latino-Critical
Scholarship,and the Black-White Binary, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1181 (1997) (book review).
35. Id. at 1200. In one of his more recent pieces, Delgado raises numerous potential
pitfalls, including the allure of minority groups aspiring to be white, the power of
whiteness, the potential compromises that might be made with that power base, and the
potential of intra-coalitional hierarchies. Delgado, Linking Arms, supra note 5, at 869-76.
36. Delgado, Linking Arms, supra note 5, at 873.
37. Id.
Given the numerous historical examples of this phenomenon, Delgado's
challenge to coalition building is accordingly a formidable one. In fact, many scholars
addressing inter-minority group coalitions have acknowledged the threat of internal strife
within coalitions. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, Race, Multiculturalism, and the
Jurisprudence of Transformation, 47 STAN. L. REV. 819, 828-29 (1995) (contending that
coalition building is necessary for confronting our own internalized racist beliefs and the
ways in which we participate in the maintenance of white supremacy); Johnson, The
Strugglefor Civil Rights, supra note 8, at 771 (noting that a major impediment to coalition
efforts is racism between and within minority communities); Wing, supra note 11, at 742-47
(noting that black/white binary thinking "can lead groups not to understand one another,
to look askance and to be disrespectful of others, and to think the other minority group is
not as important, only the relationship with whites.").
38. Delgado, Linking Arms, supra note 5, at 884. While Professor Delgado's baseball
analogy is interesting, given the economic and political prowess of whites in this society,
ethnic and racial minorities in this land more closely resemble batters holding a flimsy
plastic bat and not the classic sturdy wooden ones. Instead of looking at outsider groups
as individual batters facing opposing teams, this essay suggests that a closer analogy may
be gleaned by looking to different endeavors. Much like water buffalo facing a pride of
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other words, Delgado suggests that outsider groups may be better off
undertaking reform efforts individually rather than using concerted
action.
IV.

A NEW

VISION OF COALITIONS?

It is true that in the long run coalitions may end, morph, or dwindle
in significance. Nonetheless, real gains can be made while the coalitions
are in effect. Groups come together because they view themselves in a
similar situation, and as a result they share many, but not necessarily
all, interests. This situation is similar to the formation of political
parties, such as President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's reform of the
coalition that made up the Democratic Party in the 1930s to include the
poor and people of color.39 And like the Roosevelt coalition, many
coalitions can have significant impact.40
A recent and thought-provoking example of one such effort is the
nationwide, grassroots mobilization by millions of Latinas and Latinos
against the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration
Control Act of 2005, otherwise known as H.R. 4437, a bill aimed at
heightening penalties for illegal immigrants and their employers.41
Among other things, this bill, if made law, would have created more
than 1000 kilometers of fences and walls along the United States-Mexico
border, would make illegal entry into the United States a felony, and
would penalize a broad range of acts that would be considered aiding
and abetting illegal immigrants.4 2 The largest of the protests against
H.R. 4437 occurred on April 10, 2006 in 102 cities; one locale alone
included a crowd of over 500,000. 43 Estimates suggest that the protests
included over one million people. 44 This reaction is not only the
timeliest example of interethnic coalitions, but it is one whose impact

lions or a solitary ball carrier in a football game, a sole combatant stands little chance
when facing overwhelming numbers, but with a relatively few more compatriots, the
chances of even partial success grow dramatically. Like a group of water buffalo creating
a phalanx of protection, a few blockers in a game of football can protect a ball carrier from
superior numbers.
39. See generally Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalizationof DemocraticPolitics,
118 HARv. L. REV. 28 (2004); Mark Tushnet, Foreword: The New ConstitutionalOrderand
the Chasteningof ConstitutionalAspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29 (1999).
40. See generally DALE ROGERS MARSHALL, RACIAL POLITICS IN AMERicAN CITIES (1980).
41. H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. (2005).
42. Jorge G. Castaneda, Time to Step Up to the Plate, NEWSWEEK INT'L, Feb. 20, 2006,
at opinion page.
43. Wikipedia, 2006 United States immigrant reform protests, http://en.wikipedia.org
/wiki/2006_U.S._immigrantrights-protests (last visited Mar. 15, 2007).
44. Id.
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has captured national attention.4" This coalition was formed without
a central leader and arose from local activism, which included a handful
of radio and television personalities calling for mobilization.46 The
coalition included many Latinas and Latinos from lands believed to be
points of origination for many illegal immigrants and also included
Latinas and Latinos such as Puerto Ricans, who, by virtue of their
United States citizenship status, do not face immigration problems.4 7
The sheer diversity of the flags represented at the protests speaks to the
interethnic aspect of this groupingY This coalition was also interracial, as evidenced by the New York area protests that included immigrants from Ireland and China.49 Despite being faced by a congressional act and an abundance of conservative pundits characterizing
immigration with nativistic terms such as "an invasion" and "unAmerican," ° this coalition created a national debate over a proposed
law that would have otherwise negatively affected up to twelve million
inhabitants with little or no public debate.5 1
These grassroots protests initiated early offers at compromise by
moderates on both sides of the political aisles, including President
George W. Bush, who advocated for a guest-worker program.52

45. See Nicholas Confessore, Thousands Rally in New York in Support of Immigrants'
Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2006, availableat 2006 WLNR 5514799; Randal C. Archibold,
Latinos Protest in California In Latest Immigration March, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2006,
available at 2006 WLNR 5514845 (reporting that over 500,000 people protested
immigration reform during the March 25, 2006 protest).
46. See generally Nicole Lee, Immigration Debate Sparks Rally, FORT WAYNE NEWS
SENTINEL, Mar. 31, 2006, availableat 2006 WLNR 5396949.
47. See Ediberto Roman, Immigration and the Allure of Inclusion, 38 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1349, 1365 (2006) (noting the preferred immigration status of Puerto Ricans that
results from U.S. colonialism).
48. See Confessore, supra note 45.
49. See Day Without ImmigrantsBeing Held Today (CNN television broadcast May 1,
2006).
50. See generally PATRICK BUCHANAN, STATE OF EMERGENCY: THE THIRD WORLD
INVASION AND CONQUEST OF AMERICA (2006).
51. While at the time of this publication, the impact of this coalition is yet to be
determined, it will likely be the impetus behind a compromise that results in the passage
of a guest-worker program, which allows otherwise illegal immigrants to work legally in
the United States, or a more lenient version of the House bill in the United States Senate,
Senate Bill 1033. Senate Bill 1033 allows guest-worker programs and permits otherwise
illegal immigrants to convert their status after undertaking certain tasks, including
working, learning English, and paying taxes. Rachel L. Swarms, Split over Immigration
Reflects Nation's Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 5217845
(discussing both the House of Representatives bill and the more lenient Senate bill).
52. Stephen Dinan, Bush Signs the Fence Bill; Measure Boosts Agents, Pays for Border
Barrier,WASHINGTON TIMES, Oct. 5, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 17255319.
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However, at least for the moment, conservative opponents of immigration have the upperhand.
Somewhat ironically, during Hispanic
Heritage Month, President Bush signed the "homeland-security spending
bill," which funds the down payment for a 700-mile fence along the
United States-Mexico border.58 At the time of this writing, no significant coalitions have led protests in opposition to the "Secure Fence Act
of 2006.""4 Though the President ultimately signed the Fence Act, the
National Council of La Raza noted that President Bush unsuccessfully
advocated for comprehensive immigration reform before the 109th
Congress. " This reform could have included the creation of a process
toward granting citizenship to many illegal aliens who reside in the
nation and the creation of a guest-worker program.
In September 2006 several members of the National Association of
Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO)56 advocated before
Capitol Hill for comprehensive immigration reform." In light of the
democrats recently gaining control in Congress, it remains to be seen
whether comprehensive reform-spurred by political pragmatists or
effective coalitional efforts-is possible. Thus, the grassroots coalitional
immigration protests were vivid examples of political mobilization, but
their effectiveness remains in question.
Other examples of inter-minority group coalitions occur within the
legal academy. For instance, Professor Richard Delgado, despite his
skepticism on the subject, was instrumental in creating one such
coalition. As a founder of the Critical Race Theory (CRT) movement,
Professor Delgado was central in forming a jurisprudential movement
that challenged dominant norms and narratives in the law. This
movement was created by a racially and ethnically diverse group of legal
scholars who dramatically changed both legal scholarship and arguably
the legal academy. The CRT movement remains to this day an
important and diverse group, with many offshoot movements, including

53. Id.
54. H.R. 6061, 109th Cong. (2005). In September the House of Representatives passed
enforcement-only bills: the Secure Fence Act, H.R. 6061, 109th Cong. (2006), the
Immigration Law Enforcement Act, H.R. 6095, 109th Cong. (2006), the Community
Protection Act, H.R. 6094, 109th Cong. (2006), and the Border Tunnel Prevention Act, H.R.
4830, 109th Cong. (2006).
55. Dinan, supra note 52.
56. NALEO is an organization comprised of over 6,000 elected and appointed officials.
NALEO Home Page, http://www.naleo.org (last visited Mar. 15, 2007).
57. Latino Elected Officials March the Halls of Congress to Press for Comprehensive
Immigration Reform, U.S. NEWSWM, Sept. 13, 2006.
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LatCrit and Asian Crits.5" The CRT coalition boosted diversity in law
faculties, student bodies, and law school curricula while also substantively changing legal regimes. Even if, as some scholars have quietly
suggested, the CRT movement has lost momentum, has effectively
disbanded, or has been overtaken by related movements such as LatCrit,
the CRT coalition achieved much, and virtually every writer addressing
this subject has benefited from it.
Another example of a similar coalition arguably exists at my home
institution. The Florida International University College of Law is, for
the legal academy, a Petri dish for inter-minority group coalitional
efforts. This young and dynamic institution commenced its operations
as a diverse law school by traditional standards, with three of the
school's first eleven tenured and tenure-track professors representing
racial and ethnic minority groups. Through advocacy by these three

58. See, e.g., Francisco Valdes, Latina/o Ethnicities, CriticalRace Theory, and PostIdentity Politics In Postmodern Legal Culture: From Practicesto Possibilities, 9 LA RAZA
L.J. 1 (1996); Francisco Valdes, Foreword: Poised at the Cusp: LatCrit Theory, Outsider
Jurisprudenceand Latina/ o Self-Empowerment, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (1997) (LATCRIT I); Elvia R. Arriola, Difference, Solidarity and Law:BuildingLatina/oCommunities
Through LatCrit Theory, 19 CHICANO-LATiNO L. REV. 1 (1998) (LATCRIT II); Elizabeth M.
Iglesias, Identity, Democracy, Communicative Power,Inter/NationalLaborRights and the
Evolution of LatCrit Theory and Community, 53 U. MIAMI L. REv. 575 (1999) (LATCRIT
III) [hereinafter, Iglesias, Identity]; Dean Rex Perschbacher, Rotating Centers,Expanding
Frontiers:LatCrit Theory and Marginal Intersections, 33 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 751 (2000)
(LATCRIT IV); Elizabeth M. Iglesias, LatCrit Theory: Some PreliminaryNotes Towards
a TransatlanticDialogue, 9 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2000); Elizabeth M. Iglesias
& Francisco Valdes, Introduction: ExpandingDirections,Exploding Parameters:Culture
and Nation in LatCrit CoalitionalImagination,33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 203 (2000), 5
MICH. J. RACE & L. 787.(2000); Margaret E. Montoya, Class in LatCrit:Theory and Praxis
in a World of Economic Inequality, 78 DENVER U. L. REV. 467 (2001) (LATCRIT V); Pedro
A. Malavet, LatcriticalEncounters with Culture, In North-South Frameworks, 55 FLA. L.
REV. 1 (2003); Guadalupe T. Luna, Latcrit VI: Latinas/os and the Americas: Centering
North-South Frameworksin LatCritTheory, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 803 (2002) (LATCRIT VI);
Jo Carrillo, Seventh Annual LatCrit Conference, LatCrit VII, CoalitionTheory and Praxis:
Social Justice Movements and LatCrit Community-PartI: A Few Thoughts About Using
Visual Images in LatCrit, 81 OR. L. REV. 587 (2002); Robert S. Chang, LatCrit VII:
Coalitional Theory and Praxis, Social Justice Movements and LatCrit Community,
ProgressivePedagogy: ChallengingMaster Narrativeswith Racial and Ethnic Curricular
and Faculty Diversity, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 113 (2002) (LATCRIT VII); Deon
Erasmus, Law, Culture, and Society: LatCrit Theory and TransdisciplinaryApproaches
Law, Land, and Labor: Constructionsof Propertyand Status in Local and Global Contexts,
"Will She Speak, or Won't She? That is the Question": Comments on the Communal Land
Rights Bill, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 539 (2004); Francisco Valdes, City and Citizen: Communitymaking as Legal Theory and Social Struggle, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1 (2005) (LATCRIT
VIII); Charles R. Venator Santiago, CounteringKulturkampf PoliticsThrough Critique and
Justice Pedagogy, 50 VILL. L. REV. 749 (2005).
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professors, along with the support of many others, the faculty grew in
numbers as well as in diversity, with nine of its twenty tenured and
tenure-track professors and seventeen of its thirty-four tenured, tenuretrack, and long-term contract faculty currently self-identifying as
members of racial and ethnic minority groups. While this law school
may invariably face the challenges raised by the skeptics, it is currently
living the opportunities suggested by the advocates of coalitions.
A.

A Common Ground?

Despite the debate concerning the ability of coalitions to achieve their
goals, one thing seems clear: successful coalitions should construct
identities of otherwise diverse groups in ways that can promote
mobilization.59 Coalitions need to learn how to articulate intergroup
comparisons in ways that "energize new solidarities and promote more
fluid and inclusive political identities by revealing new interconnections
and commonalities among the oppressed"6 0
Many writers on the
subject agree with this view but fail to provide specific examples of how
to find that common identity or common ground. In other words, these
writers have failed to provide substantive examples of commonalities.
One fairly obvious, but at the same time obscure, common ground may
be the shared history of oppression of many people of color in this
land."' These collective memories, which include repeated denials of
basic rights, form a starting point for commonalities. The following
account is the actual, but rarely addressed, comparative analysis of this
government's treatment of people of color when those groups sought to
become full members of the body politic. This common history and
identity is the sad and shockingly similar exclusionary practice by the

59. See Romero, supra note 22, at 1601.
60. Iglesias, Identity, supra note 58, at 583.
61. See, e.g., Angel Oquendo, Re-Imagining the Latino/a Race, 12 HARv. BLAcKLETTER
L.J. 93 (1995). Professor Oquendo argued for Latinas and Latinos to reject dividing and
racialized labels such as "'Black Hispanic,'" and instead asked for the recollection and
embracing of the common Latina and Latino history of struggle against oppression. Id. at
93. In this eloquent piece, Professor Oquendo also asked Latinas and Latinos to not lose
sight of the value of their common language. Id. at 94. The very same argument was
made by this Author at virtually the same time in another article. See Roman, Common
Ground:Perspectives on Latina-LatinoDiversities, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 483,486 (1997).
Recognizing this commonality is also similar to the creation of a "chain of equivalents"
based on an "appreciation of the interconnectedness of different [histories] of oppression."
See CHANG, supra note 15, at 131. While Chang rejects coalitions based on identity
constructs, the use of the notion of equivalents is particularly applicable to this project's
effort to find commonality based on similar histories of struggle against oppression. It is
a call for the collective memories of this land's people of color who were repeatedly
reminded of their partial membership or citizenship.
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federal government against every single statistically significant minority
group seeking to become citizens. One primary legal vehicle that this
society used to operationalize that common practice of partial membership, or in other words, exclusion, was the plenary powers doctrine. My
previous works assert that the period from roughly 1850 to 1900 was a
consequential era for defining who could become a citizen.6 2 The
government's repeated response to minority group efforts to become
formal members of society during this era was rejection. This historical
fact is a significant common identity and point of common interest in the
struggle for acceptance that may be a political rallying point for many
marginalized groups.
The primary source for formal membership within this country, the
Constitution's Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 3 is
a post-Reconstruction amendment specifically aimed to provide former
slaves the rights associated with citizenship. Despite this amendment,
the United States repeatedly denied people of color the right to full
membership. Even when the United States granted the right, it
withheld the full panoply of benefits associated classically with it. 6
Many of these injustices stem from century-old constitutional doctrines
that gave the political branches of government complete or plenary
power over these groups and established disparate treatment for the less
favored.6 5 Those over whom the United States government exercised

62. See, e.g., EDIBERTO ROMAN, THE OTHER AMERICAN COLONIES: AN INTERNATIONAL
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW EXAMINATION OF THE UNITED STATES' NINETEENTH AND
TWENTIETH CENTURY ISLAND CONQUESTS (2006).
63. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
64. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,272-73 (1995) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg noted that numerous instances of unequal treatment
"reflective of a system of racial caste only recently ended, are evident in our workplaces,
markets, and neighborhoods. Job applicants with identical resumes, qualifications, and
interview styles still experience different receptions, depending on their race." Id. at 273.
65. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393,404 (1857) (holding that African-Americans are
not citizens as contemplated by the federal or state constitutions); Goodell v. Jackson, 20
Johns. 693, 712 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823) (holding that Indians are not citizens but distinct
tribes or nations); Natsu Taylor Saito, AssertingPlenary Power Over The "Other":Indians,
Immigrants, Colonial Subjects, and Why U.S. Jurisprudence Needs to Incorporate
InternationalLaw, 20 YALE L. & POLY REV. 427 (2002); Abel A. Bartley, The Fourteenth
Amendment: The Great Equalizer of the American People, 36 AKRON L. REV. 473 (2003).
Despite adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment, most former slaves found their status
changed little. Bartley, supra, at 481. While the Amendment ensured that humans would
no longer be considered property, it did not grant equality. Id. The institution of "'Black
Codes'" in many states 'returned the belief in sub-humans and restored the idea of human
chattel ....
Collectively, the 'Black codes' were intended to reduce the status of African
Americans to a level just above slavery and to demolish thoughts of racial equality." Id.
Since the adoption of the Constitution, the clause giving Congress "[plower to dispose of
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complete power were in effect deemed by that same government not to
be true citizens, but outsiders.6 6 These doctrines were based on
xenophobic, nativist, and racist sentiments. In the 1800s, the United
States Supreme Court began articulating a doctrine that formally
subordinated certain groups by allowing the government's political
branches so-called plenary power to discriminate against indigenous
peoples, inhabitants of the United States' overseas colonial possessions,
and immigrants.6 7 The doctrine was and continues to be used as a
weapon to disenfranchise those groups universally recognized as the
most vulnerable. 6 It is the plenary power doctrine and a similar one
applied to African-Americans that formed the central constitutional
vehicle to disenfranchise African-Americans and continues to support the
subordination of indigenous peoples, as well as the inhabitants of the
United States' island colonies.
During this era, the United States Supreme Court and Congress
habitually rejected each and every statistically significant racial
minority group seeking full citizenship status.6 9 Between the mid1800s to the early part of the 1900s-the period of "membership
eugenics"-the United States Supreme Court issued a series of decisions
obstensibly based upon immigration, national security, and overseas
expansion, but ultimately established the inferior membership status of
various minority groups. These cases include the infamous Dred Scott
v. Sandford" and Plessy v. Ferguson71 decisions with respect to

and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States" has never been changed. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
American Indians have long been subject to the plenary powers of the United States,
variously attributed to the Constitution's war powers, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; treaty
powers, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2; and commerce clauses, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
Lawrence Baca, The Legal Status of American Indians, in 4 HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN
INDIANS 230, 231 (1988).
Finally, while the Thirteenth Amendment superseded the
Constitution's article IV,section 2 requirement that slaves be returned to their owners, as
noted earlier, it did not grant equality to persons of color. This deficiency facilitated the
adoption of Jim Crow laws in several states, which were later ratified by the famous
doctrine of "separate but equal" in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896).
66. Saito, supra note 65, at 429.
67. Id. at 432.
68. Id. at 429-31.
69. See id. at 447-77. Even though naturalization was also open to blacks after 1870,
in only one case did a petitioner for citizenship even attempt to assert a claim other than
on the basis of being "white." See Scott, 60 U.S. 393.
70. 60 U.S. 393. Justice Taney opined:
The question before us is, whether the class of persons described in the plea in
abatement compose a portion of this people, and are constituent members of this
sovereignty? We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not
intended to be included, under the word "citizens" in the Constitution, and can

650

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

African-Americans; Elk v. Wilkins, 2 United States v. Kagama,7 3 and
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock74 with respect to indigenous peoples; the
Chinese Exclusion Cases75 with respect to Asian immigrants; and the
Insular Cases76 with respect to the inhabitants of the island conquests.
In each of these decisions, racial and ethnic minority groups challenged
the propriety of governmental action on the grounds that it unconstitutionally discriminated against the particular group. 7 In each decision,

therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides
for and secures to citizens of the United States. On the contrary, they were at
that time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been
subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained
subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who
held the power and the Government might choose to grant them.
Id. at 404-05.
71. 163 U.S. at 548-49 (holding that a statute requiring railroads carrying passengers
to provide equal but separate accommodations for white or colored races was constitutional).
72. 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884) (holding that an Indian born a member of one of the Indian
tribes within the United States, which still exists and is recognized as a tribe by the
government of the United States, who has voluntarily separated himself from his tribe and
taken up his residence among the white citizens of a state, but who has not been
naturalized or taxed or recognized as a citizen, either by the United States or by the state,
is not a citizen of the United States within the Fourteenth Amendment).
73. 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886) (holding that for so long as the Indians preserve their
tribal relations, they owe no allegiance to the state in which they live, and the state has
no power over them; but being within the limits of the United States, they are subject to
acts of Congress).
74. 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903) (holding that Congress may pass laws that conflict with
treaties made with the Indians).
75. These cases grew out of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which prevented
immigration of Chinese laborers. See Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, 22 Stat. 58 (1882).
Upon its original sunset, the law was expanded ten years later to tighten all immigration
and travel from China. See Act to Prohibit the Coming of Chinese Persons into the United
States of May 5, 1892, 27 Stat. 25 (1892).
76. There are nine cases that are most commonly referred to as the Insular Cases. See
Efren Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of American Colonialism:The Insular Cases
(1901-1922), 65 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 225, 240 (1996). The Insular Cases include DeLima v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Grossman v.
United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Armstrong
v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Huus v. N.Y

& P.R.S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901); and
Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901). These cases determined

the status and applicability of the United States Constitution to territories, facilitating U.S.
imperialism without granting full citizenship rights to territorial residents. For a
revisionist view of the doctrine established by the cases, see Christina Duffy Burnett,
United States:American Expansion and TerritorialDeannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797

(2005).
77. See Burnett, supra note 76, at 833-70.

20071

COMMON GROUND

the Court used similar racial and xenophobic justifications to uphold
disparate treatment. 71 With the exception of the treatment of AfricanAmericans, the constitutional justification to support such unequal
treatment was the inherent or plenary powers doctrine.79
In each of these cases, the United States Supreme Court concluded
that even the most basic liberty protections, as a matter of constitutional
law, did not apply to these groups. Generally, the Court based its
holdings on international law principles and concluded that because
Congress, the government's political branch, was primarily responsible
for national security, issues that touched upon the status of individuals
from sovereigns within and without the physical boundaries of the
United States should be addressed primarily by the political branch of
government rather than the judicial branch.
Though the following pages will demonstrate that each of the largest
groups of color in this land suffered. racism and exclusion, one could
argue that the nature and form of oppression varied from group to
group, therefore, their histories are dissimilar. As Professor Delgado
observes, this country has historically victimized Mexicans, Asians,
indigenous people, territorial island people, and African-Americans, but
did so in different ways and oppressed these people for different
reasons-typically for land or slave labor.8 " This disparity may lead
some to conclude that these groups have less in common than what is
8
proposed in this essay.
" The more significant point, however, is not
the form of oppression or reason for it, but the effectuation of that
oppression and the common result of treating these people as something
other than full and equal members of this society. The following section
will accordingly briefly examine the common history of exclusion against
each of these groups.
1. The Indigenous People. The plenary power of Congress over
the indigenous nations stems from a series of Supreme Court decisions
that began in 1823.
The doctrine sanctioned the repeated abuse of
these indigenous peoples' rights, including continued breaches of treaties
entered into with the United States government and theft of their

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell's Toolkit-Fit to Dismantle that Famous House?, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 283, 298 (2000).
81. See id. at 305.
82. See DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT: THE MASKING OF JUSTICE 25-27,45 (1997) (discussing fifteen landmark cases where
the United States Supreme Court truncated Indian human rights).
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inhabiting lands.8 3 The doctrine also justified paternalistic "wardship"
over the indigenous people that typically resulted in the theft of their
land and other rights.8 4 For instance, Chief Justice John Marshall
described the attitude of that era: "[Tihe tribes of Indians inhabiting this
country were fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and whose
subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave them in
possession of their country, was to leave the country a wilderness . .. 85
The subordinate status of the indigenous people was further confirmed
in the 1884 case of Elk v. Wilkins. 6 John Elk, an indigenous person,
renounced his tribal membership, became a Nebraska resident, and
sought to register to vote.87 Despite the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court determined that the Fourteenth Amendment was
available only to persons who at birth were completely subject to United
Because indigenous nations were "distinct
States jurisdiction. 88
political communities" "within the territorial limits of the United States,"

83. See generally DEE BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE (1970) (giving
eyewitness accounts of the U.S. government's attempts to acquire Native Americans' land
by using threats, deception, and murder); VINE DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF
BROKEN TREATIES (1974) (raising questions about the status of Native Americans within
the political landscapes); GLORIA JAHODA, THE TRAIL OF TEARs (1975) (describes how white
settlers forced Indian tribes off plains).
84. See generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WEsTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT (1990).
85. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 590 (1823). The Court further stated:
The exclusion of all other Europeans, necessarily gave to the nation making the
discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives, and establishing
settlements upon it. It was a right with which no Europeans could interfere. It
was a right which all asserted for themselves, and to the assertion of which, by
others, all assented.
Id. at 573.
86. 112 U.S. 94, 102 (1886) (holding that if Native Americans born within the United
States had not been naturalized and had not become a citizen through any treaty or
statute, these Native Americans were not citizens within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
87. Id. at 94-95.
88. Id. at 102. The Court stated:
Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States, members of, and
owing immediate allegiance to, one of the Indian tribes, (an alien though
dependent power,) although in a geographical sense born in the United States, are
no more 'born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,' within
the meaning of the first section of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment, than the
children of subjects of any foreign government born within the domain of that
government, or the children born within the United States, of ambassadors or
other public ministers of foreign nations.
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they were not completely subject to United States jurisdiction."9 Noting
the exclusive, as well as the exclusionary, nature of United States
citizenship, the Court concluded, "[N]o one can become a citizen of a
nation without its consent," ° and because indigenous people "form[ed]
no part of the people entitled to representation," 91 they "were never
deemed citizens."9 2
The denial of membership to the indigenous people was premised on
notions of inferiority. The group was characterized as existing in a state
of "ignorance and mental debasement."93 The Supreme Court in United
States v. Ritchie' declared, "From their degraded condition and
ignorance generally, the privileges extended to them in the administration of the government must have been limited; and they still, doubtless,
required its fostering care and protection."9 5 Professor Robert Porter
recently observed that "Indians today have the status of a minor-acknowledged as citizens but not fully recognized as being able to
care for [their] own affairs."96 United States citizens because they have
been born on American soil, indigenous people are still regarded as part
of their tribal communities and afforded rights and immunities subject
to their tribal governments.97 The application of the plenary powers
doctrine constitutionalized the inferior citizenship status of indigenous
people and resulted in Indian nations losing ninety million acres of
reservation land, more than two-thirds of their former holdings.98
2. The Territorial Island People. The plenary powers doctrine is
also the basis for the subordination of island inhabitants who were

89. Id. at 98.
90. Id. at 103.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 100; see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians,
Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign
Affairs, 81 TEX.L. REV. 1, 57 (2002). Thus, even after the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the United States courts continued to reject these people as full members.
In Johnson the Court justified the taking of indigenous lands by looking to the international law principle of discovery, which basically concluded that land found by westerners
belonged to westerners. 21 U.S. at 595.
93. Goodell, 20 Johns. at 720.
94. 58 U.S. 525 (1855) (holding that the title of the land to the purchaser in the
purchaser's petition to the board of commissioners setting forth his claim to the land
against the government and others is confirmed).
95. Id. at 540.
96. Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the Native
Americans:Redressing the GenocidalAct of ForcingAmericanCitizenship Upon Indigenous
Peoples, 15 HARV. BLACKLETrER L.J. 107, 135 (1999).
97. Id.
98. Saito, supra note 65, at 441.
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colonized by the United States. 99 The United States Supreme Court
used the plenary powers doctrine to avoid extending island inhabitants
full constitutional protections. In the period's major public policy debate,
the Court in Downes v. Bidwell,' ° the leading Insular Case, concluded
that the Constitution did not follow the flag.10 ' "[T]he power to
acquire territory by treaty," Justice Brown stated, "implie[d] not only the
power to govern such territory, but to prescribe upon what terms the
United States will receive its inhabitants, and what their status shall be
in what Chief Justice Marshall termed the 'American Empire.' " 10 2 In
sum, the plenary power of Congress arose from the inherent right to
acquire territory and the Territorial Clause of the Constitution,0 3
which endorsed the United States' treaty-making power and the power
to declare and conduct war in other lands. According to the logic of the
day, the Constitution applied to the territories only to the degree that
Congress extended it to them.' 4 As a result, for island inhabitants,
there was never any pretense concerning the Fourteenth Amendment's
applicability or equality for that matter.' 5 These individuals did not
receive citizenship through the Fourteenth Amendment, the vehicle used
to grant or impose such status on virtually all other groups who have
attained citizenship. Island inhabitants became associated with the
United States as a consequence of their status as inhabitants of lands
conquered by the United States. For the inhabitants of lands acquired
in this manner, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the
Territorial Clause in article IV, section 3 of the Constitution, and not the
Fourteenth Amendment, determines the rights of this group.0 6 As
interpreted, this provision endowed Congress with complete or plenary
power over these people.0 7 In turn, the Court and Congress have
kept
08
island inhabitants in a subordinate and disenfranchised status.

99. Ediberto Roman, The Alien-Citizen Paradox and Other Consequences of U.S.
Colonialism,26 FLA. ST..U. L. REV. 1 (1998).
100. 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
101. Id. at 270-71.
102. Id. at 279.
103. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, para. 2.
104. Ramos, supra note 76, at 246-47.
105. The label of alien-citizen can also theoretically apply equally to the other nonwhite
citizens addressed in the previous section.
106. Downes, 182 U.S. at 285-86.
107. DeLima, 182 U.S. at 196 (quoting Nat'l Bank v. County of Yankton, 101 U.S. 129,
133 (1879)).
108. The island people who exist under the control of the United States but are not full
members of the body politic reside in the island groups of Puerto Rico, American Samoa,
Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, the United States Virgin Islands, the Federated
States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau. The island groups
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The United States began its overseas expansion during the period of
the Spanish-American War, which resulted in several Spanish territorial
concessions. In the Treaty of Paris, Spain officially ceded "to the United
States the island of Porto [sic] Rico and other islands now under Spanish
sovereignty in the West Indies." 9 Consistent with the United States
Constitution's grant of Congress's plenary power under the Territorial
Clause, article nine of the Treaty of Paris granted Congress the power
over "[t]he civil rights and political status" of the territories and its
people.11 ° The Treaty of Paris endorsed the United States' imperialistic venture as it was among the first times in American history that a
treaty acquiring territory for the United States appeared to offer no
promise of American citizenship."' In addition, the treaty contained
no promise, actual or implied, of statehood." 2 As a result of the war,
the United States formally acquired Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines.1 1 3 The U.S. Virgin Islands were later purchased from the
Danish government in 1907." 4

examined here fall into two categories: the first group comprises the unincorporated United
States territories, and the second group is the newly created sovereign, yet dependent,
island groups of the South Pacific. The islands of Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana
Islands, Guam, the United States Virgin Islands, and American Samoa are so-called
unincorporated territories. These island groups are dependent lands that the United
States Supreme Court, in the series of decisions known as the Insular Cases, concluded
were neither foreign countries nor part of the United States. See, e.g., id. The
unincorporated territories undoubtedly should be classified as those existing under a
colonial regime because the United States Congress has plenary or complete power to
govern the territories, including the ability to nullify local laws and enact federal
legislation dictating the rights of the inhabitants of those territories; none of the territories
are fully incorporated as a state of the union or a sovereign nation. Although all
inhabitants born in the territories are United States citizens (nationals in the case of
Samoans), island inhabitants do not enjoy the same rights as citizens on the mainland and
have no voting representation in the federal government. These last colonial indicia ensure
that the island inhabitants do not receive the same amount of aid or other government
largesse provided to similarly-situated citizens on the mainland, nor do these people have
the ability to vote for President, Vice President, or any member of Congress.
109. Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain,
art. 2, U.S.-Spain, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754.
110. Id. at art. 9; see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. ("The Congress shall have
Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory
or other Property belonging to the United States.").
111. Jost A. CABRANES, CITIZENSHIP AND THE AMERICAN EMPIRE 5-6 & n.12 (1979).
112. Id.; see also Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement between the
United States of America and the Mexican Republic, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 122.
113. JuLIus W. PRATT, AMERIcA's COLONIAL EXPERIMENT 68 (1950).
114. CIA, World FactBook 2005, availableat https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/fact
book/geos/cq.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2007).
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While the inhabitants of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands have obtained a form of citizenship and Samoans have obtained
the status of nationals, each membership differs from traditional
Fourteenth Amendment citizenship. The consequential aspect of these
colonized islanders' subordinate memberships is that, unlike their
brethren on the mainland, islanders are not entitled to participate in the
national political process; 115 they have no representation in Congress
as residents of the territories, cannot vote for President and Vice
President, and their repective territories bear no electoral rights.
Further, island inhabitants are not entitled to full constitutional
protection and, arguably, their limited citizenship status can be stripped
at any time.116
The inhabitants of Puerto Rico received citizenship in 1917. Similarly,
the unincorporated territory of Guam has been granted this same form
of American citizenship, even though as a possession of the United
States the island can be "bought, sold or traded by the federal government."'1
The residents of the Virgin Islands received United States
citizenship in 1927, and the inhabitants of the Northern Mariana Islands
attained it in 1976.118 The residents of the unincorporated territory of
American Samoa have received even less; as nationals, they have even
fewer rights. Accordingly, the diluted form of citizenship granted to
these people under Congress's Territorial Clause power changed little in
terms of rights but merely facilitated a belief of belonging to the United
States.
The inhabitants of these lands, with the exception of the Samoans,
received a title that suggested equal rights and power in the political
process; in actuality they received little more than a label, coupled with
a perception on their part that they were attaining something of
consequence. For the United States, the effect of these grants was that
"[those at the helm of all branches of the metropolitan government saw
as fit that citizenship be granted for particular political and strategic

115.

EFREN RIVERA-RAMOS, THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY: THE JUDICIAL AND

SOCIAL LEGACY OF AMERICAN COLONIALISM IN PUERTO Rico 156 (2001) (observing that the
residents of Puerto Rico retain an alien attribute despite being United States citizens as
they cannot vote for President and Vice President and do not have representation in
Congress).
116. See Congressional Research Service Memorandum: Discretion of Congress
Respecting Citizenship Status of Puerto Rico (Mar. 9, 1989), in 2 PUERTO RICO: POLITICAL
STATUS REFERENDUM, 1989-1991 81-85 (Puerto Rico Fed. Affairs Admin. ed., 1992).
117. H.R. 1720, 103d Cong. (1993).
118. Ramos, supra note 76.
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reasons without effectuating a change in the political condition of the
territories."" 9
3. African-Americans. The inferior status of African-Americans
did not derive from the plenary powers doctrine, but rather the United
States Constitution, interpreted through similar racist constructions. As
originally drafted, the Constitution excluded African-Americans in article
I, section 2, which counted African-Americans as three-fifths of a free
person. 2 ° In addition, the first Supreme Court decision to address the
political status of African-Americans did not base its decision on the
plenary powers doctrine; however, it did arise during the same period as
that doctrine's creation and employed similar racist and nativist bases
to subordinate indigenous people, recent Asian immigrants, and inhabitants of United States' island conquests.' 2 ' Thus, while the case that
sanctioned the disenfranchisement of African-Americans was technically
not a plenary powers decision, it is analogous in terms of its whitesupremacist foundation.
As a result of the atrocity of slavery and their resultant lack of a
homeland other than the United States, African-Americans following the
principle ofjus solis, should have been recognized as American citizens,
as they could not owe any allegiance to a government other than their

119. Id. at 156. The disenfranchised status of residents of the island territories has not
only caused inequality of political and civil rights, but has also manifested itself through
unequal economic treatment. See 26 U.S.C. § 933 (2000) (Puerto Rican citizens, with the
exception of federal employees, are exempt from federal income taxes on income earned in
Puerto Rico). For instance, as a result of their subordinated status, residents of Puerto
Rico receive less favorable treatment than the mainland citizens under a number of major
federal benefits programs. For the residents of Puerto Rico, federal payments under Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Medicaid, and food stamps are made at
lower levels and are subject to an overall cap. See S. Rep. No. 101-481, at 10-11 (1990)
(Conf. Rep.) ("Under present law, federal social welfare programs under the Social Security
Act such as AFDC, Medicaid, Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled, Foster Care and
Adoption Assistance, and Social Services block grant operate differently in Puerto Rico
than they do in the states. Under statehood, both the amount of the welfare benefits and
percentage of population receiving them would increase."); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Puerto Rico and the Constitution:Conundrums and Prospects, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 15, 15
(1994). Similarly, the Supplemental Security Income program (SSI) does not apply to
Puerto Rico. See Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 2 (1978) (holding that government benefits
of a state citizen do not transfer when that citizen moves to Puerto Rico). Benefits under
a similar program are capped and are made at lower levels than SSI payments made to
eligible persons residing in the States. Benefits for needy children are likewise provided
at appreciably lower levels. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (1994).
120. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
121. Scott, 60 U.S. 393.
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place of birth.'22 Thus, the principles of equality and membership
should have always applied to African-Americans. However, they did
not.
The court-sanctioned exclusion of African-Americans is most vivid in
1 23
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Scott v. Sandford,
where the Court held that African-Americans, even those born in a free
territory, were not United States citizens. 2 4 Irrespective of their title
of free person or slave, the African-American could not become a full
member of society.'25 In other words, because of the Court's endorsement of state-sanctioned racism and marginalization, nonwhites, such
as African-Americans, were incapable of attaining full equality.
After the long, bloody, and destructive Civil War, the United States
Constitution was amended and purportedly granted citizenship status

122. Jonathon C. Drimmer, The Nephews of Uncle Sam: The History, Evolution, and
Application of Birthright Citizenship in the United States, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 667, 691
(1995).
123. 60 U.S. 393.
124. Id. at 404. After engaging in an extensive discussion of the meaning of
citizenship, Justice Taney, writing for the Court, noted: "We think they [AfricanAmericans] are.., not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word
'citizens' in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges
which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States." Id. In
that matter, the plaintiff, Dred Scott, was borninto slavery in Virginia sometime around
1800. Scott's master, an Army doctor, eventually moved him to Minnesota, a jurisdiction
that forbade slavery. Scott sued for his freedom, claiming that he was in a free territory
and therefore could not be a slave in that land. Id. at 431-32.
125. See ERc FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERIcA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 18631877 25-26 (1988). Even Northern states did not grant equality and full citizenship to the
free black population prior to the Civil War. As Foner synthesizes:
[Tihe war ... held out hope for an even more radical transformation in the
condition of the tiny, despised black population of the free states. Numbering
fewer than a quarter million in 1860, blacks comprised less than 2 percent of the
North's population, yet they found themselves subjected to discrimination in every
aspect of their lives. Barred in most states from the suffrage, schools, and public
accommodations, confined by and large to menial occupations, living in the
poorest, unhealthiest quarters of cities like New York, Philadelphia, and
Cincinnati, reminded daily of the racial prejudice that seemed as pervasive in the
free states as in the slave, many Northern blacks had by the 1850s all but
despaired of ever finding a secure and equal place within American life. Indeed,
the political conflict between free and slave societies seemed to deepen racial
anxieties within the North. The rise of political antislavery in the 1840s and
1850s was accompanied by the emergence of white supremacy as a central tenet
of the Northern Democratic party, and by decisions by Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, and
Oregon to close their borders entirely to blacks, reflecting the fear that, if slavery
weakened, the North might face an influx of black migrants.
Id. (citing LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 17901860 (1961)).
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to "all persons" born in the United States.126 Nonetheless, as W.E.B.
DuBois questioned after the Civil War, serious doubts persisted as to
whether African-Americans were not only free, but also political
persons.'27 DuBois noted that the Fourteenth Amendment emancipates a multitude with no political rights. Accordingly, while the
perception of many may have been that emancipation would immediately
evolve to enfranchisement, that conclusion was far from the case, just as

126. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
127. W.E.B. DuBois, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA: AN ESSAY TOWARD A
HISTORY OF THE PART WHICH BLACK FOLK PLAYED IN THE ATrrEMPT To RECONSTRUCT
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 1860-1880 289 (1935). Dubois observed:
It is clear that from the time of Washington and Jefferson down to the Civil War,
when the nation was asked if it was possible for free Negroes to become American
citizens in the full sense of the word, it answered by a stern and determined "No!"
The persons who conceived of the Negroes as free and remaining in the United
States were a small minority before 1861, and confined to educated free Negroes
Were we not loosing a sort of gorilla into
and some of the Abolitionists ....
American freedom? Negroes were lazy, poor and ignorant. Moreover their
ignorance was more than the ignorance of whites. It was a biological, fundamental and ineradicable ignorance based on pronounced and eternal racial differences.
The democracy and freedom open and possible to white men of English stock, and
even to Continental Europeans, were unthinkable in the case of Africans.
Id. at 132. Carl Schurz, German immigrant, intellectual, and idealist, who traveled the
South extensively in preparing a report on the reconstruction efforts in the Gulf states for
President Johnson, found the situation little improved in the years after the war. DuBois
quotes from Schurz's account at length and also finds corroboration from reports from
several states to the congressional Joint Committee on Reconstruction. Among Schurz's
observations:
The emancipation of the slaves is submitted to only in so far as chattel slavery in
the old form could not be kept up. But although the freedman is no longer
considered the property of the individual master, he is considered the slave of
society, and all independent state legislation will share the tendency to make him
such. The ordinances abolishing slavery passed by the conventions under the
pressure of circumstances will not be looked upon as barring the establishment of
Wherever I go-the street, the shop, the house, the
a new form of servitude ....
hotel, or the steamboat-I hear the people talk in such a way as to indicate that
they are yet unable to conceive of the Negro as possessing any rights at all. Men
who are honorable in their dealings with their white neighbors, will cheat a Negro
without feeling a single twinge of their honor. To kill a Negro, they do not deem
murder; to debauch a Negro woman, they do not think fornication; to take
property away from a Negro, they do not consider robbery. The people boast that
when they get freedmen's affairs in their own hands, to use their own expression,
"the [expletive] will catch hell." The reason of all this is simple and manifest. The
whites esteem the blacks their property by natural right, and however much they
admit that the individual relations of masters and slaves have been destroyed by
the war and by the President's emancipation proclamation, they still have an
ingrained feeling that the blacks at large belong to the whites at large.
Id. at 136.
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DuBois feared.' 2' Despite theoretically attaining citizenship and its
related rights and anointments of belonging, African-Americans were
subsequently and repeatedly treated in an unequal manner, 2 ' notwithstanding the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was
supposed to grant them full citizenship status.5 ° Though Brown v.
Board of Education' specifically rejected the separate but equal
dichotomy of Plessy, even that decision failed to lift segregation's stigma
in public schools, as evidenced by the Brown II decision, 3 2 its progeny,
and the social phenomenon of white-flight.

128. Id. at 180. Reconstruction evoked great fear of political equality in the South,
which had already begun passing black codes in many of its states. DuBois analyzed the
South's outlook:
Here, then, was the dominant thought of that South with which Reconstruction
must deal. Arising with aching head and palsied hands it deliberately looked
backward. There came to the presidential chair, with vast power, a man who was
Southern born; with him came inconceivable fears that the North proposed to
make these Negroes really free; to give them a sufficient status even for voting,
to give them the right to hold office; that there was even a possibility that these
slaves might out-vote their former masters; that they might accumulate wealth,
achieve education, and finally, they might even aspire to marry white women and
mingle their blood with the blood of their masters.
Id. Nevertheless, lest the North attempt to claim the moral upper hand on enfranchisement issues, one must recall that voting was still a privilege for "whites only" in states like
Ohio, Maryland (a split loyalty state during the Civil War), and New Jersey in 1867. See
JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION: AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 74 (Univ. of Chicago Press
1961).
129. See STETSON KENNEDY, JIM CROW GUIDE: THE WAY IT WAS (1990).
130. Scholars have chronicled the pre-Civil War, as well as post-Civil War, disenfranchisement of African-Americans. These chronicles trace the post-Civil War efforts by white
Southerners to immediately attempt to implement a de facto form of slavery through
efforts such as the "Black Codes," which were designed to ban political participation in
particular, and destroy any pretense of equality, in general. These oppressive efforts
occurred with the full support of President Andrew Johnson. The continued disparate
treatment of these people, which was often sanctioned by the Court, created the de facto
inferior citizenship status of this group. For instance, despite the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment, in Plessy, Justice Brown, writing for the majority, upheld a
statute that required the segregation of white and "colored" persons. Justice Brown based
his discussion on a constructed distinction between social and legal equality. He concluded
that "[t]he object of the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute
equality of the two races before the law, but, in the nature of things, it could not have been
intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from
political, equality...." Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544. The Court rejected petitioner's argument
that the separation of the two races stamped one race with a badge of inferiority. See id.
131. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Court overturned Plessy and the "separate but equal"
doctrine, holding that it had no place in public education. Id. at 495. Segregation was a
denial of the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment and separate
educational facilities were "inherently unequal." Id.
132. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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4. Mexican-Americans. Mexican-Americans were also denied full
membership during the membership eugenics period. Their entry into
the membership debate arose during the same period of the first use of
the plenary powers doctrine and their denial of rights were similarly
based on racist and nativistic perspectives. As one writer noted: "Fifty
years before the pilgrims landed at Plymouth Rock, there were [Latino
and Latina] urban centers in New Mexico and in Florida. Yet [Latinos
and Latinas], according to most Americans, are our most recent
arrivals-and they have some basis for thinking that."3 '
Many
Americans know that the United States conquered land from the
indigenous people consisting of approximately "two million square miles
of territory by conquest and by purchase."134 What is not as well
known is that the United States conquered Mexico in 1848 and took over
half its then-existing territory. The states of California, Nevada, and
Utah, as well as portions of Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, and
Wyoming were created from a 529,000 square mile cession by the
Republic of Mexico. 3 '
As Professor Richard Delgado observed:
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ... purported to guarantee to
Mexicans caught on the U.S. side of the border full citizenship and civil
rights, as well as protection of their culture and language. The treaty,
modeled after ones drawn up between the U.S. and various Indian
tribes, was given similar treatment: The Mexicans' "[1]and and
property were stolen, rights were denied, language and culture
suppressed, opportunities for employment, education, and political
representation were thwarted." 36
Mexican-Americans were disenfranchised in numerous
including immigration: "The Constitution and the courts
interfere with racist immigration quotas, the Bracero
dragnet searches, seizures and deportations of anyone
Mexican." 1"7

other ways,
[did] little to
system, and
who look[ed]

133. Harry Pachon, Special Report: What ColorIs the Constitution?Crossingthe Border
of Discrimination:Has the Civil Rights Movement Ignored Generations of Hispanics?, 15
HUM. RTs. Q. 32, 33 (1988).
134. Christine A. Klein, Treaties of Conquest:PropertyRights, Indian Treaties, and the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 26 N.M. L. REV. 201, 201 (1996).
135. Id.
136. Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform: Will We Ever
Be Saved? And We Are Not Saved: The Elusive Quest for RacialJustice, 97 YALE L.J. 923,
940 (1988) (review essay) (quoting ARMANDO RENDON, CHICANO MANIFESTO 71 (1971)).
137.

Id.
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In theory, the Treaty, which ended the Mexican-American War of 1846
to 1848, promised "grace and justice" by codifying the principal
diplomatic objective[s] of each party. For the United States, "grace"
meant purchasing, for the bargain-basement price of $15 million,
[thousands and thousands of acres of former Mexican territories]. For
Mexico, "justice" meant protecting the civil and property rights of
Mexican citizens, including Indians, who without moving had suddenly
become new residents [and citizens] of a foreign nation. 3 '
As one writer observed:
In the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and in numerous Indian treaties,
the United States promised to respect property rights of the conquered.
To make such promises during the nation's idealistic youth or during
its feverish expansion across a seemingly-unlimited
continent is one
39
thing; to keep them is quite another.'
Despite the grant of United States citizenship pursuant to the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, over one hundred years later MexicanAmericans were still not accepted as full citizens."4 For instance, in
1954 the United States government initiated "Operation Wetback," the
campaign to deport undocumented Mexicans. During this massive
campaign, over one million Mexican immigrants, as well as United
States citizens of Mexican ancestry, and undoubtedly other Latinas and
Latinos, were deported.
5. Asian and Other Nonwhite Immigrant Groups. Asian and
other immigrant groups have also experienced rejection during the
period of membership engenics. An example of the inferior status of
other nonwhites is the historical use of the plenary powers doctrine to
justify the deportation and exclusion of undesirable Asian immigrants
who otherwise were entitled to enter or stay in the United States. In
1889, in the Chinese Exclusion Cases, the United States Supreme Court
first extended the plenary powers doctrine to immigration. In Chae
Chan Ping v.

138.

United States,'

the plaintiff, a Chinese

resident,

Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, Mexican Americans in the United States on the

Sesquicentennialof the Treaty of GuadalupeHidalgo, 5 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 5, 6 (1998).
139.

Klein, supra note 134, at 253; see also Guadalupe T. Luna, On the Complexities

of Race: The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgoand Dred Scott v. Sandford, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV.
691, 698-700 (1999).
140.

JUAN RAMON GARCIA, OPERATION WETBACK: THE MASS DEPORTATION OF MEXICAN

AMERICAN UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN 1954 229-31 (1980); see also JULIAN SAMORA, Los
MOJADOS: THE WETBACK STORY 52 (1971).
141. 130 U.S. 581,609 (1889) (holding that entry into the United States could be denied
to Chinese laborers because Congress had authority under the sovereign powers delegated

2007]

COMMON GROUND

663

obtained a required certificate of reentry pursuant to an 1884 law
established by Congress and visited his family in China. Prior to his
return, Congress passed a new law precluding reentry of all Chinese
workers, irrespective of whether they had a certificate of reentry.'42
The Supreme Court rejected the claim that the government had violated
an international treaty.'" Though acknowledging a technical violation
of the treaty with China, the Court decided to enforce the Congressional
action under the "last in time rule," whereby a court would uphold a
federal law that conflicted with a treaty even if it violated international
law.'
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court iterated Congress's
power to regulate the rights of immigrants, which was deemed an
inherent power of the government to protect itself from foreign threats.
In practice, then as it is now, the foreign immigration
threat was
4
categorized in racial constructions as nonwhite. 1

by the Constitution to exclude foreigners and that any existing treaty with China did not
strip them of their power).
142. Id. at 589-90.
143. Id. at 589-600.
144. See id. at 600-03.
145. Unfortunately, the other means of attaining membership status under the
Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been applied in an equally racist
manner as recently documented in the book White By Law, where Ian Haney Lopez
chronicled the history of United States naturalization law. IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY
LAW (2000).
Pursuant to Article I of the United States Constitution, Congress is
empowered "to establish a uniform rule of naturalization." Id. at 42. Haney Lopez
observed that "from the start, Congress exercised this power in a manner that burdened
naturalization laws with racial restrictions that tracked those in law of birth-right
citizenship." Id. For instance, the first naturalization act enacted in 1790 limited
naturalization to "'any alien, being a free white person who shall have resided within the
limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States for a term of two years.'" Id. For
over 162 years, race was a determining factor in whether one could become naturalized.
It was only in 1870, after the Civil War, that African-Americans could be naturalized.
From 1870 until 1952, when strict white versus black racial prerequisites were abolished,
whites and blacks could be naturalized, but other minority group members, particularly
Asians, could not. Id. at 42-43. During the period of these racial prerequisites, applicants
from Hawaii, China, Japan, Burma, and the Philippines, as well as all mixed-race
applicants, failed in their naturalization arguments before courts. Id. at 61. Courts,
however, concluded that applicants from Mexico and Armenia were "white," but vacillated
over the whiteness of applicants from India, Syria, and Arabia. Id. at 61, 67-77. Not only
were these naturalization laws shameful examples of this country's racist hostility to
nonwhites, but these hostilities were specifically expressed, ironically, through the concept
of citizenship. Haney Lopez cogently summarized the effect of such exclusionary efforts:
The prerequisite cases make clear that law does more than simply codify race in the
limited sense of merely giving legal definition to pre-existing social categories. Instead,
legislatures and courts have served not only to fix boundaries of race in the forms we
recognize today, but also to define the content of racial identities and to specify their
relative privilege or disadvantage in United States society. The operation of law does far
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CONCLUSION

Coalitions, conflict, and civil rights are as much today the subject of
great interest and debate as they were during the civil rights era of the
1960s. Not unlike the differences between Martin Luther King, Jr. and
Malcolm X, civil rights advocates of the day differ greatly on whether
coalitions should be formed and if so, what form they should take. This
essay departs in aspects from both sides of the debate. It rejects the
cynicism associated with detractors of inter-minority group coalitions,
and it provides a concrete rallying point for coalition formation, unlike
many advocates of such movements that merely refer to the need for
common ground. Be they labeled members of a political race, people of
color, or some other construction, the marginalized racial and ethnic
minorities of this land must begin their political mobilization by
recalling their common struggle against repression.

more than merely legalize race; it defines the spectrum of domination and subordination
that constitutes race relations. Id.

